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S
oftware quality remains a challenge for software practitioners in the 21st century. The cost of failed projects has sparked considerable public criticism, 1 and even in those projects that produce a system, failure is all too frequent. Unfortunately, software development is subject to repeated fashion-based changes and often isn't well controlled through experiment (although developers have learned much experientially, particularly in testing software systems).
In the sense that testing is an activity whose primary purpose is to find problems, essentially two forms of software testing exist. Static testing tries to discover potential problems by simply examining a design or piece of code; no attempt is made to run the system. The archetypal static-test technique is the design or code inspection. 2 Dynamic testing involves observing a running system to discover inputs that lead to unexpected outputs. Statictest techniques find faults, whereas dynamic-test techniques find failures. All failures are caused by at least one fault, but not all faults lead to failure. (Definitions in this field vary in the literature. In this article, I use the nomenclature that I used in previous work.) 3 In an ideal world, testing would stop when the engineer has found and corrected all the faults leading to failures (that is, defects). Because this achievement is generally impractical, in all engineering systems the risk of failure is present in the delivered product. Engineers traditionally deal with this risk using the concepts of "good enough" or, with critical systems, "as low as is reasonably practical" (Alarp). With conventional systems, such as those in civil, mechanical, and aeronautical engineering, historical experience is often an excellent guide to the system's future behavior. This experience is the product of a continual feedback process based on failure analysis, as Figure 1 shows. Over the years, as the engineering discipline matures, engineers continually diagnose failing systems to prevent future failures of the same nature.
Checklists of faults that could lead to failure are a natural output of this diagnostic process and can take many forms. This variety is apparent, for example, from the checklist discussion on NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's excellent Software Quality Web site (http://sw-assurance.gsfc.nasa.gov/ disciplines/quality). This article's primary objective is to assess how useful checklists are in practice in code inspections, using formal statistical inference.
Code inspections and checklists
Since Michael Fagan's seminal work, 2 researchers have reiterated the benefit of code inspections (Bill Brykczynski has provided a detailed review 4 ). Although inspections almost certainly are one of the most successful technologies discovered for defect removal, it's unclear whether they can detect all fault modes. 5, 6 Because generally nothing is known of runtime behavior during an inspection, inspections attack the entire fault space irrespective of any temporal properties. In contrast, dynamic testing attacks only that subset of faults that can be provoked to fail in a given runtime (see Figure 2 ). As time goes by, the subset of faults that have led to failures gradually grows within the set of faults that could lead to failure. For various reasons, the subset might not ever fill the entire fault space. As Edward Adams emphatically demonstrated, 7 a significant percentage of defects, about one-third in his case, took at least 5,000 execution years to fail for the first time. Such defects would be effectively impossible to reveal with dynamic testing, so static techniques such as code inspections remain the only option. Of course, some systems might never see 5,000 execution years, but a reasonably ubiquitous embedded control system, for example, can exceed such a total collectively in a few weeks or even days.
One source of faults that can never lead to failure during a program's life cycle is the set of faults that can't be executed, because no possible execution path can provoke their failure. In some complex systems, significant parts are effectively unreachable, so this set can be large.
Inspections have the added benefit of taking place before runtime testing starts. Since Barry Boehm's work in 1981, 8 it's been widely known that finding defects during this phase is substantially cheaper to address than finding the same defects during runtime testing (unit, system, acceptance, and so on).
The essence of the checklist, a prediction mechanism in relation to Figure 1 , is to formalize the process of common fault mode detection and avoidance during inspections. 5 First, the engineering team must acquire and analyze data on previous defects (faults known to have caused failures) to identify repetitions before codifying them in checklist form for future developments. In the absence of any such data, it's also possible to construct checklists by interviewing experienced engineers, but quantifying the result and any resulting benefit is often more difficult. Second, inspectors must continually cross-reference checklists and the code or design being inspected. Unfortunately, in softwarecontrolled systems, historical experience is usually unavailable, undocumented, or of questionable relevance because the build techniques have changed too much and prediction mechanisms are correspondingly undermined.
Related work has focused on perspective-based reading (PBR) applied to requirements documents, notably by Victor Basili and his colleagues. 9 Their research provides a detailed, robust assessment of the statistical significance of their results, which include the finding that teams who apply PBR achieve significantly better fault coverage of documents.
The experiments
This article is rooted in an experiment assessing how well capture-recapture techniques can help predict a component's total number of faults. 10 The experiment used a two-part inspection:
1. Individual preparation. Two engineers each inspect a program. 2. Simulating a logging meeting. The two engineers together determine which faults they found in common. 5 I call this two-part process a two-person team inspection. Such information is useful as follows: P(A) is the probability of person A detecting a fault in some product, and P(B) is the probability of person B detecting a fault in the same product. Then, with the assumption that A and B are independent (which I test later),
P(A ∩ B) = P(A)P(B)
Furthermore, suppose that there are n faults altogether, that person A finds a faults, person B finds 
Faults that could cause failures
Faults that have caused failures b faults, and they find q faults in common. Then, using the previous equation,
Provided q ≠ 0, this process provides a simple way to estimate the total number of faults using data on the number of faults two inspection groups found in common, again under the assumption of independence.
Experimental design
Selecting the right program to inspect for the experiment took some time. The principal constraints were engineering time and the ability to calibrate the experiment in terms of knowing how many faults were in fact present. I solved this latter problem by restricting the inspection's scope to a known class of faults in the C programming language that checklists can easily categorize. 11, 12 These faults are often known as code inconsistencies and are easily verified. In addition, the program would need enough faults to produce reasonable results; preferably, it would have originated from a real system. On the basis of these criteria, I chose a C program, originally part of a highintegrity system. I slightly modified and reduced it to 62 lines, removing all identification, although the process didn't alter any of the faults described here. Although this program was small, it fit all the criteria well. I then analyzed the program both automatically and manually for the chosen set of faults. This let me specify the total number of faults quite precisely as 26 ± 2. The error bound, although subjective, mirrors the fact that some statically detectable failure-prone fragments in this program might have associated noise. 12 The presence of so many faults in a real system is somewhat unusual. Almost all programs I analyzed previously showed the presence of such faults but at a much lower rate of around one every 120 lines or so. 11 This program is atypically but not uniquely very poor, but it suited the experiment well, giving the results a finer granularity. Engineers weren't told how many faults to expect. Table 1 gives examples of some of the fault modes and occurrence rates. The fault modes not included in the table had some associated degree of noise-for example, the recommendation that if and else branches be brace-enclosed.
As I noted previously, these faults fall under the general umbrella of inconsistent language use. They are easy to categorize in checklists and are often the subject of such lists in real inspections. 13 Tools can, in principle, automatically detect such faults, although tool deployment is often rather variable between development groups. In this case, whether the engineer could detect the faults automatically doesn't detract from the essence of an inspection, and it allows independent verification of the faults. In practice, it's generally considered wise to automate fault detection as much as possible, leaving the remainder for human eyes.
I gathered these faults into seven checklist categories: data flow (initialization and use of objects), static faults (fundamental misunderstandings in the use of C), interface disorders, undefined behavior in the language, function use unprotected by prototypes, potentially dangerous behavior, and masked declarations.
With code inconsistencies, presenting a full list of all fault modes usually isn't feasible-for example, several hundred exist in C (undefined behavior alone contains 97 items). Moreover, presenting faults as a checklist of categories is common in programming standards. 13 The engineers became familiar with the detailed contents of all the cat- egories over a preceding two-day course, and I presented the bulleted subset (about one-third of all such categories) verbatim with a preamble. I told the engineers using this checklist that all the faults in the program fell into this subset of categories, with the intention of reducing the potential number of inconsistencies to consider and forcing them down profitable avenues-for example, data flow. Those engineers not using the checklist were told only that the code to be inspected contained an unspecified number of code inconsistencies. Individual engineering experience ranged from two to 20 years.
Experimental procedure
The original idea was to test capture-recapture techniques and their ability to predict the total number of faults in a program. Such techniques' success depends on independence, as I mentioned earlier, so I set up the experiment in two parts: Part 1 aimed to test independence. I introduced checklists on a random basis (the developer decided whether to use them) to mirror the common practice in industry that their use isn't always mandated. 13 Part 2 aimed to test the ability to predict the total number of faults, assuming that Part 1 supported independence.
Part 1: 2003-2005.
This part involved groups of industrial embedded-system engineers from Germany (four two-person teams in one location and four two-person teams in another), Austria (three twoperson teams), and India (11 two-person teams). Over a two-year period, the groups were allowed to inspect the described program individually for a total of 30 minutes, corresponding to an inspection speed of approximately 120 lines of code per hour. This speed lies within the most efficient range, according to Watts Humphrey, 6 and is a little fast, according to Tom Gilb and Dorothy Graham. 5 Next, individual engineers combined in teams of two to compare notes for a further 15 minutes to determine which faults they had found in common. Each engineer decided whether to use a checklist; this choice wasn't recorded. I originally expected that using checklists would compromise independence. That is, if two engineers used the same checklist individually, the number of faults they found in common would increase. However, the assumption of independence was essential to the capture-recapture part of the project originally planned; consequently, I tested it statistically:
Two events, A and B, are independent if and only if P(A ∩ B) = P(A)P(B). So, I tested the statistic P(A ∩ B) − P(A)P(B) using the KolmogorovSmirnov test for normality. The result is that this statistic is consistent with a normal distribution N( = 0.0183,  = 0.07433) with a power p = 0.82. The equivalent 95 percent confidence interval for the mean is (−0.0084, 0.0484), which includes 0.0, so the hypothesis that P(A ∩ B) − P(A)P(B) is normally distributed with a mean of 0 can't be rejected. Therefore, the hypothesis of independence can't be rejected.
This inconclusive result was surprising. The use of checklists by at least some of the engineers, even anonymously, would be expected to render the independence assumption questionable at best. A percentage of the population would be individually driven preferentially toward well-known fault modes. Furthermore, the inspected program included some of these fault modes. As a result of these findings, I redesigned Part 2 of the experiment to explore this observation further.
Part 2: 2006-2007. In this part, over an eight-month period, engineers in Germany and Sweden (119 two-person teams altogether) were allowed to inspect the described program under the same conditions as Part 1, except I selected specific engineers to use the checklists. The selection was such that, at the stage where pairs of engineers compared what they had found in common, either both engineers or neither engineer had used checklists. This detail maximized the possibility of seeing a positive relationship between the use of checklists and the number of faults found. Selected engineers used the checklist side-by-side with the code under inspection. The other engineers didn't see the checklist. Finally, the selection provided that no engineer using a checklist sat next to an engineer not using a checklist.
The space here can't accommodate the full anonymized raw data for this experiment. So, in the interests of both pedagogy and repeatable science, they're freely available for download and analysis at www.leshatton.org/Data_Inspections_05-06-2007. html. Table 2 (see next page) summarizes the results.
These data are now suitable for direct testing. Therefore, I make these hypotheses: H 0 , the null hypothesis. The number of faults found does not depend on the use of checklists. H 1 , the alternative hypothesis. The number of faults found does depend on the use of checklists.
To infer that the number of faults does indeed depend on the use of checklists, the data must where Xi, s i , and N i are respectively the sample means, standard distributions, and number of samples for the data using checklists and the data not using checklists. Any significant difference in the means can imply a real effect at some confidence level. Substituting the numbers from Table 2 To reject the null hypothesis and infer a significant difference between the checklist and nonchecklist populations at the commonly used 5 percent level, z must be > 1.9. This result isn't even significant at the 10 percent level, so no basis for rejecting H 0 exists. Therefore, the conclusion must be that no basis exists to reject that the number of faults found doesn't depend on the use of checklists.
It's useful to repeat the same calculation for the number of faults found in common. As I've just discussed, you might expect that any effect would Again, this isn't significant at any standard level, so evidence is still lacking to reject the hypothesis that the number of faults doesn't depend on the use of checklists.
Discussion
This negative result is again troubling. In Part 1 of this experiment, when the choice of whether to use checklists was left up to the engineer and not recorded, no significant pattern challenging the notion of independence emerged from the data, contrary to expectations. In the second part, using a different set of engineers and assigning checklists to some of them to emphasize the presence of any biasing effect, still no significant pattern emerged. If checklists provide a benefit, it doesn't present itself at any statistically significant level in either of the experiment's two parts. In spite of this, previous references have shown that inspections successfully find defects. So, I'll advance this hypothesis: when a human inspects a program, a checklist is too simplistic to describe the mental processes involved. Of course, engineers might simply ignore checklists even when requested to use them, but this seems unlikely, given the numbers involved in the experiment.
There is, of course, an underlying assumption: checklists for code consistency are representative of checklists as a whole. Given the nature of checklists, this assumption seems reasonable, and my experiment did mirror common industrial practice. 13 However, further experiments would be necessary to explore this in detail.
observations on outliers
The data set's size let me perform statistical tests to identify any relationship between checklists and the number of faults found. I isolated two sections of the population: the high region-those who found 16 faults or more-and the low region-those who found 11 faults or fewer. Analyzing these two populations separately gives the results in Table 3 Again, neither result is significant at any standard level, so the experiment can't distinguish any significant difference due to the use of checklists based on the number of faults found.
Variation between engineers
Researchers have noted that software developers' performance for various skills varies widely (by a factor of 10 or more). 15, 16 This data set affords the possibility of quantifying this notion for fault detection in inspections. For the data set as a whole, the mean was 13.66 and the standard deviation was 5.12. This gives a rather wide 95 percent confidence interval of 13.66 ± (1.96 × 5.12) = [3.62, 23.70] , with the best member of the population about a factor of 10 better than the worst. Harold Sackman and his colleagues 15 and Lutz Prechelt 16 found similar results but in the rather different categories of productivity and performance. In Sackman's study, this was observed even when restricted to experienced engineers only.
two-person teams vs. individuals
The data also allows an estimate of how much better a two-person team performs than an individual. The average number of faults found was 13.66 (53 percent) by individuals and 19.71 (76 percent) by two-person teams.
T his formal statistical analysis of 308 individual inspections for code inconsistencies reveals that the data couldn't reliably distinguish whether the participants had used checklists. It's tempting to associate the number of faults the engineers found in this experiment with individual inspector experience, but this wasn't recorded in sufficient detail here. Moreover, Basili observed that there is little if any relationship between years of experience and the number of faults found.
It might well be that checklists depend critically on how they're worded or enforced and that the checklist I used was deficient in some regard. In its defense, this checklist followed a model often used in industry, and such critical sensitivity alone would be cause for some concern. However, the simplest explanation of my inconclusive results might be that reasonably experienced engineers appear to use personalized internal methods, whether or not they're given checklists. Basili observed that people with more experience are more likely to fall back on what they normally do. 9 These internal methods might even take the form of implicit checklists, but this is a matter for further investigation. As I mentioned before, the checklists here deal with only one kind of fault, code inconsistency, and the piece of code under inspection was relatively short. Whether these results extend to the many other kinds of software inspection is also a matter for further formal investigation.
Finally, this data set also revealed a high variation in individual inspector's performances, with the worst being a factor of 10 or so less effective than the best. Such a factor has emerged in other studies in areas as disparate as productivity 15 and performance. 16 For example, even though Sackman and his colleagues restricted the group under study to experienced programmers, broad variation still existed. 15 This continuing wide disparity between the best-performing and worst-performing engineers in any programming group, even when measured in very different ways, remains an obstacle to progress in the consistent production of reliable systems within a fixed time and budget. 
